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NOTE
DON'T CROSS THE STREAMS: PAST AND
PRESENT OVERSTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONNECTION WITH
CONVENTIONAL FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT OBLIGATIONS
Theodore Kill*
The obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors
and investments has existed as a concept of international economic law at
least since the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations. The fair and equi-
table treatment provision is a key protection contained in the vast majority
of modern bilateral investment treaties. Tribunals adjudicating alleged
breaches of these fair and equitable treatment provisions have not arrived
at a uniform interpretation of the term. As a threshold issue, however each
tribunal must address the question of whether a state's obligations under a
given treaty's fair and equitable treatment provision will be additive or
equal to the state's preexisting obligations toward all aliens under the
minimum standard required by customary international law. Some tribu-
nals have responded to this question by announcing that the protections
afforded under fair and equitable treatment provisions and customary in-
ternational law have converged such that a state's obligations under either
standard are coextensive. This Note contends that tribunals adopting the
convergence approach overstate the protections afforded to investors under
customary international law. By subsuming the obligation to provide fair
and equitable treatment within customary international law, these tribu-
nals also ignore the historical development of fair and equitable treatment
as a solely treaty-based obligation that did not bind states as a matter of
customary international law.
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INTRODUCTION
Modem bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") almost uniformly feature a
provision that requires the host state to provide "fair and equitable treat-
ment" to the investors and investments of the other treaty party.' The
provision has become the focal point of modem investor protection, emerg-
ing as "the outcome-decisive right, eclipsing even the more established
protection against expropriation" in terms of importance.2 The standard of
treatment required of a host state under such provisions has been defined
differently by tribunals and academics alike. Nevertheless, a consensus of
commentators and adjudicators agree that whatever the substantive content
of the standard, unlike the applicable standards under national-treatment 3 or
most-favored-nation clauses,4 the fair and equitable treatment requirement is
1. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 475 (2002); Antonio R.
Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modem Investment Laws, Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT L.J. 287, 291 (1997); World Bank Group, Progress Report on the "Legal Framework" for the
Treatment of Foreign Investment, 7 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 307, 310 (1992).
2. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION para.
7.04 (2007); see also Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment
Treaties, 39 INT'L LAW. 87, 87 (2005).
3. The national-treatment standard requires a state to treat investors no worse than the state
treats its own citizens. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
63-65 (1995); LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 28: 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES 161 (2004); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 83-86 (2007); Claire Crfpet Daigremont, Traitement na-
tional et traitement de la nation la plus favorisie dans la jurisprudence arbitrale recente relative b
l'investissement international, in LE CONTENTIEUX ARBITRAL TRANSNATIONAL RELATIF A
L'INVESTISSEMENT 107, 107 (Charles Leben ed., 2006); Marie Suzuki, Les Principes Directeurs du
Rdgime Juridique, in DROIT DE L'ECONOMIE INTERNATIONALE 675, 680-81 (Patrick Daillier et al.
eds., 2004).
4. The most-favored-nation standard requires a state to provide treatment to investors that is
no less favorable than the treatment that the state provides to the investors of any other state.
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 65-66; 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3,
at 191; Daigremont, supra note 3, at 107-08; Suzuki, supra note 3, at 680-81.
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noncontingent.' As a noncontingent requirement, the determination of what
is fair and equitable in a given context does not depend on a state's domestic
laws or on the treatment of its own nationals or commitments to third states.
In interpreting a state's compliance with its obligation to provide fair and
equitable treatment, adjudicators-in most cases international tribunals con-
vened pursuant to BITs or multilateral investment treaty dispute resolution
clauses-must therefore consider the actions of the state and investor in
light of an objective international standard of fair and equitable treatment.
In addition to the inherent difficulty in developing a justiciable standard
based on notions as broad as fairness and equity,6 institutional and doctrinal
factors frustrate the enunciation of a clear and reliable standard. Because the
provisions appear in bilateral agreements, the rules of treaty interpretation
subject the term "fair and equitable" to a multiplicity of discreet, substantive
meanings. Customary international law regarding the interpretation of trea-
ties, as codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties ("VCLT"), instructs adjudicators to give terms their ordinary
meaning in light of each treaty's context, object, and purpose, with reference
to the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion and preparatory work as ap-
propriate.7 But because these contextual and teleological factors differ for
each treaty, this rule permits, and may even require, tribunals to arrive at
different conclusions regarding the proper standard of state behavior re-
quired to comply with identically worded fair and equitable treatment
5. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 3, at 58; A.A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES
TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 135-41 (1962); U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., KEY CONCEPTS
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES 12 (1990); 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
supra note 3, at 215; Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Interna-
tional Investment Law 2 (Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs, Working Paper No. 2004/3, 2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf. The tribunal in Genin v. Republic of
Estonia reinforced this point by citing Dolzer and Stevens' observation that fair and equitable treat-
ment provisions "provide a basic and general standard which is detached from the host State's
domestic law." Genin v. Republic of Estonia, Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, para. 367 (ICSID June 25,
2001). The only challenge to this orthodoxy so far appears to be an article that claims that the inter-
national minimum standard, understood to include fair and equitable treatment, is a noncontingent
standard in part because the substantive content of the minimum standard must be determined with
reference to other rules of international law. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges the accuracy of
distinguishing between the noncontingent standard of fair and equitable treatment and the contin-
gent standards of national and most-favored-nation treatment. The author agrees that "[flair and
equitable treatment is a non-contingent standard because it does not depend on external facts or
law.... Nevertheless, it derives its content from international law. In this sense, it is contingent on
specific rules of international law." Alireza Falsafi, The International Minimum Standard Of Treat-
ment Of Foreign Investors'Propert: A Contingent Standard, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 317,
354 (2007). The novelty of this approach seems to lie more in reimagining the definition of "contin-
gent" than in redefining the scope of the substantive protections afforded under the minimum
standard. See Suzuki, supra note 3, at 679 (stating that the fair and equitable treatment requirement
implies that a state must respect all sources of international law in its relations with investors).
6. Oscar Schachter has said that "[n]o concept of international law resists precise definition
more than the notion of equity." Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: Gen-
eral Course in Public International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 82 (1982).




provisions.8 Furthermore, the nature of international investment dispute
resolution contributes to the uncertainty regarding the standard of treat-
ment.9 Despite the fact that hundreds, if not thousands, of BITs include the
provision, the lack of a system of formal precedent or stare decisis leaves
each tribunal free to construct its own definition of the applicable standard
in a given dispute. While tribunals certainly take into account the findings of
previous adjudicators, the precise scope of a host state's substantive obliga-
tions under a fair and equitable treatment provision is in fact determined on
a case-by-case basis.
Despite the diversity and uniqueness of factors inherent to any articula-
tion of the applicable standard, almost all adjudicators called upon to
interpret a fair and equitable treatment provision must answer the same
question: under the terms of the particular treaty, does the term "fair and
equitable treatment" impose an obligation over and above a state's duty un-
der customary international law to provide a minimum standard of treatment
to aliens within their jurisdiction,' ° or are the obligations under fair and eq-
uitable treatment provisions coextensive with this minimum standard? Put
another way, each tribunal must determine whether obligations under a fair
and equitable treatment provision are additive or equal to a state's generally
applicable obligations towards aliens under customary international law."
8. 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3, at 217; see also Order on Provi-
sional Measures, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405, 413 (Int'l Trib. L. of the
Sea 2001); Stephen Fietta, Expropriation and the "Fair and Equitable" Standard: The Developing
Role of Investors' "Expectations" in International Investment Arbitration, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 375, 389
(2006).
9. See McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 2, para. 7.07; L.A. Podesta Costa, La Jurispruden-
cia de los Tribunales de Arbitraje como Fuente del Derecho, 1950-51 INTER-AM. JURID. Y.B. 3
(1953); Matthew C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 79, 103-04 (2006).
10. The minimum standard of treatment of aliens under international law is, like the fair and
equitable treatment standard, a noncontingent standard. Unlike fair and equitable treatment, how-
ever, the minimum standard applies as a binding obligation on states under customary international
law. States therefore have an obligation to meet the international minimum standard independent of
their treaty obligations under BITs or other international instruments. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 502-03 (6th ed. 2003). Throughout this Note, the terms
"minimum standard," "customary minimum standard" and "international minimum standard" will
be used to refer to the legal concept of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under custom-
ary international law.
11. See e.g. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Case No.
ARB/97/3, Award, para. 7.4.10 (ICSID Aug. 20, 2007); Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Case
No. ARB/01/3, Award, para. 253 (ICSID May 22, 2007); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Case
No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 289 (ICSID Feb. 6, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine
Republic, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, para. 282 (ICSID May 12, 2005); Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, para. 189 (London Ct. of Int'l
Arb. July 1, 2004); Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras. 289-94 (UNCITRAL
March 16, 2006); MCLACHLAN et al., supra note 2, para. 7.08. Some tribunals avoid the question
entirely either by stating that the conduct in question violates either standard of treatment or thor-
ough obfuscation. A notable example of the latter can be found in Siemens A.G., Case No.
ARB/02/8, paras. 289-300.
12. The additive interpretation has been dubbed the "plain meaning" approach because the
terms "fair and equitable" are given their ordinary meaning under such an interpretation. I U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3, at 212.
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Under an additive or plain meaning approach, tribunals may take into ac-
count the underlying equities of the investor-state relationship in resolving a
dispute. By contrast, under an approach that equates fair and equitable
treatment with customary international law, the role of equity is limited to
that of a background norm.
In large part, an interpretive note issued by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
sparked the debate regarding the relationship of fair and equitable treatment
and the customary minimum standard. The note specified that for purposes
of the NAFTA, "[t]he concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full
protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond
that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard
of treatment of aliens."'3 In light of the interpretive note, NAFTA tribunals
have articulated a restrictive approach to the interpretation of NAFTA's fair
and equitable treatment language. Under the restrictive approach, tribunals
have found that obligations under the NAFTA article requiring fair and equi-
table treatment apply only within the scope of a state's obligations toward
aliens under customary international law.
While adjudicators and commentators continue to disagree with regard
to the delineation of the proper relation between fair and equitable treatment
and the minimum standard, 4 this Note argues that at least one view may be
discounted. Specifically, the holdings of tribunals finding that the two stan-
dards have "converged" such that the protections afforded under an additive
interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard are equal to those
under the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under customary interna-
tional law overstate the substance of the latter standard and should not be
considered to represent an accurate depiction of customary law in subse-
quent disputes.' In implementing their convergence approach, these
tribunals have looked to the jurisprudence of tribunals that interpret fair and
equitable treatment clauses to require a higher standard of treatment than
that imposed by the minimum standard to inform the standard of treatment
in the cases before them. Having defined the applicable standard with refer-
ence to the jurisprudence of the tribunals adopting an additive approach, the
convergence tribunals then simply announce that the standard articulated
is in fact equal to the minimum standard required under customary inter-
national law. This "crossing of the streams" is pernicious because it blurs
the line between conventional and customary international law, provides
13. Quoted in Mondev International, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award,
para. 101 (ICSID Oct. 11,2002).
14. Suzuki, supra note 3, at 675, 678; Thomas J. Westcott, Recent Practice on Fair and
Equitable Treatment, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 409, 411-12 (2007). A new book begins its
chapter on investor treatment with the following sentence: "Of all the catalogue of rights vouchsafed
to investors under bilateral investment treaties (BITs), none has proved more elusive, or occasioned
as much recent controversy as the guarantee of 'fair and equitable treatment.'" MCLACHLAN ET AL.,
supra note 2, para. 7.01.
15. Brownlie notes the "tendency of writers and tribunals to give the international standard a
too ambitious content." BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 503.
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inconsistent jurisprudence to future tribunals, and decreases the ability of
potential parties to an investment dispute to predict whether or not a claim
for violation of fair and equitable treatment is valid. 6 The effects of conver-
gence are particularly infelicitous for governments that may find many
previously legitimate policy options are now deemed to violate customary
international law as well as for those developing countries whose public
administration may be incapable of meeting the stringent standard devel-
oped under the additive interpretation. 
7
The convergence approach is also inconsistent with the historical evolu-
tion of fair and equitable treatment as a concept within international law.
The consistent practice of multilateral treaties and international organiza-
tions up to the Havana Charter of the abortive International Trade
Organization ("ITO") reveals that states did not view the obligation to pro-
vide fair and equitable treatment as deriving from customary international
law. The assertion of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ("OECD") in its 1962 and 1967 Draft Conventions on the
Protection of Foreign Property that the fair and equitable treatment require-
ment is equal to the international minimum standard for treatment of aliens
should therefore be discounted as representing the view of capital-exporting
countries only. The contemporary criticisms of the OECD's assertion and
the Draft Conventions' status as an outlier in this regard confirm that the
Draft Conventions did not alter the conception of fair and equitable treat-
ment as an obligation that states could assume independent of their existing
customary international law obligations toward aliens.
This Note argues that tribunals adopting a convergence approach over-
state the protections afforded to investors under customary international law
and ignore the historical development of fair and equitable treatment as a
legal concept independent of the customary minimum standard for treatment
of aliens. Part I analyzes the important distinction between equity as a gen-
eral principle informing the interpretation of customary international law
and equity employed as a rule of decision under international law.'" This
Part argues that tribunals that adopt the convergence approach and equate
these two readings of equity overstate investors' substantive protections un-
der customary international law. Part II then traces the trajectory of the
notion of fair and equitable treatment under international economic law
from its first appearance in the League of Nations Covenant to the 1967
16. See VAN HARTEN. supra note 3, at 89.
17. A senior economist at the World Bank observes that "legal systems in most developing
countries are inequitable." Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and
Education in Developing Countries, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL
REINFORCEMENT 65, 72 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005). If the convergence approach
is accurate and host states owe a duty of equitable treatment to foreign investors, then the simple
operation of some states' legal systems may place these states in breach of customary international
law.
18. By "rule of decision," I mean a legal norm that controls in a given case. On this defini-
tion, a rule of decision is distinguished from other normative considerations that, subject to the
discretion of the adjudicator, may or may not affect the outcome of a case.
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OECD Draft Convention.' 9 This Part concludes that the fair and equitable
treatment provisions contained in these conventions did not refer to a stan-
dard of treatment that was coextensive with the minimum standard of
treatment of aliens but rather created an applicable standard and an obliga-
tion that was-and remains-independent of a state's obligations under
customary international law. Because the fair and equitable treatment provi-
sion found in modem BITs is a direct transplant from these early efforts to
establish multilateral instruments for investor protection, the provision's
relation to the minimum standard for treatment of aliens under these instru-
ments should inform modem-day understanding of the standard's
evolution. °
I. CLARIFYING THE CURRENT CONFUSION REGARDING FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT
This Part provides an overview of the role of equity in international law
and the modem jurisprudence regarding fair and equitable treatment, argu-
ing that tribunals adopting the convergence approach have confused the two
roles. Section L.A distinguishes between equity as a general principle of in-
ternational law, which informs any interpretation of the law, and equity
employed as a rule of decision, which international law proscribes absent
some legal rule affirmatively requiring the application of equitable princi-
ples. This distinction is necessary because the primary substantive
19. Prior to 1967, the term had been used in U.S. BITs, but it was not until after this date that
the explosion of BITs including fair and equitable treatment provisions took place. Also, note that
the requirement for fair and equitable treatment did not cease to appear in multilateral conventions
after 1967. Under UNCTAD's principles for controlling restrictive business practices, state action
taken to counteract such practices "should ensure treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable,
on the same basis to all enterprises, and in accordance with established procedures of law." U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE SET OF MULTILATERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
AND RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES at 12, U.N. Doc.
TB/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.I, U.N. Sales No. E.81.nI.D.5 (1981), adopted by G.A. Res. 35/63, para. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63 (Dec. 5, 1980); see also, e.g., ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 612, 613 (1988).
20. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 291 (ICSID
Feb. 6, 2007); Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, para. 123
(ICSID Oct. I1, 2002); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award, 41 I.L.M. 1347, paras. 60-61
(NAFTA May 31, 2002). Under Article 32 of the VCLT, tribunals could incorporate this Note's
historical analysis as circumstances of the treaty's conclusion. Any application of the historical
analysis under Article 32 would of course be subsidiary to the treaty's ordinary meaning in light of
its context and object and purpose. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 196,
200 (2000) (stating that under Article 32, an interpreter "may also look at other treaties on the same
subject matter adopted either before or after the one in question which use the same or similar
terms"); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 126-27, 141-47 (2d.
ed., 1984). Muchlinski advances a non-VCLT-derived basis for reliance on this Note's historical
analysis. He states that adjudicators have a duty to determine the meaning of the standard "in the
context of the value system that underlies the international investment protection treaties" requiring
fair and equitable treatment. Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of
the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 533
(2006). The "value system" that underpins the investment treaties cannot be understood without




difference between the additive and restrictive approaches relates to the role
of equity. Under an additive approach, equity may be properly employed to
craft rules of decision, while equity may be invoked only in its capacity as a
background norm under the restrictive approach. Section I.B compares the
applicable standard as articulated by ad hoc tribunals that have adopted an
additive interpretation and NAFIA tribunals that have adopted a restrictive
approach, applying the fair and equitable treatment standard only within the
scope of a state's customary international legal obligations. Section I.B de-
fends the proposition that when tribunals adopt an additive interpretation of
fair and equitable treatment provisions, these provisions permit judges to
have recourse to equity as a rule of decision in constructing a standard of
required treatment that prohibits a wider range of government actions than
those proscribed under the international minimum standard and tempered by
the general principle of equity. Section I.C highlights the problem that re-
sults when tribunals purporting to apply the international minimum standard
of treatment "cross the streams" and import jurisprudence developed under
the additive approach into the articulation of the minimum standard under
customary international law. The result is a vast overstatement of the prohi-
bitions of customary international law and a conflation of the two roles of
equity as set out in Section I.A.
A. The Roles of Equity in International Law
The difference in the substantive standards of treatment articulated by
tribunals adopting additive and restrictive interpretations of fair and equita-
ble treatment provisions is largely attributable to the role that the
international law concept of equity plays under each interpretation. Equity is
a malleable concept within international law, but even diffuse concepts can,
and must, be parsed when applied in concrete cases. Equity writ large in-
cludes at least two discrete legal concepts. The first is equity as a
background norm, or general principle of law, that informs an adjudicator's
application of the relevant legal norms. The second is equity as a legal norm,
or rule of decision, that directly controls the outcome of a given dispute.
Equity in the former sense should be taken into account in every dispute. As
a general principle of international law, judges should consider the equities
of each case "with the goal of softening the sharp edges of the law in con-
sideration of the particularities of each case.' 2 ' In this sense, equity is a
manifestation of the general principle that in applying the law, judges render
a just decision.22 Such an application of equity is considered to be infra
legem-within the parameters of the law-because equity is employed only
21. Karl Strupp, Le Droit du Juge International de Statuer Selon L'Equitd, 33 RECUEIL DES
COURs 351, 462 (1930) ("[L]'dquitd nous apparait comme une disposition, ... comme principe
gdndral de droit, ... dans le sens ... d'une norme qualifije au sens ddfinit plus haut, avec le but
d'adoucir la rigueur du droit par la considiration de la situation propre b chaque espce."); see
also Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at 77 (June
28) (separate opinion of Judge Hudson).
22. See Schachter, supra note 6, at 82-85.
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as a "method of interpretation of the law in force."23 The Institut de Droit
International characterizes the consideration of equity infra legem as inher-
ent in any proper application of the law.1
4
This conception of equity's role as a general principle of justice, how-
ever, does not permit judges to look to equity for generally applicable rules
of decision in any dispute. As the Institut de Droit International observed,
"considerations of equity cannot drive an international judge in rendering
her sentence, without being required by the relevant law, unless all parties
have given their clear and expressed consent."25 The decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") and its predecessor support this view." When
the parties consent to resolve their dispute according to general principles of
21
equity, the judge is said to apply equity contra legem.
However, when the applicable customary law requires an adjudicator to
resolve a dispute by employing equitable principles so as to reach an equita-
ble result, equity can provide the rules of decision in the absence of an
expressed agreement between the parties to a dispute. In the case of mari-
time boundary delimitations, for example, "the legal concept of equity is a
general principle directly applicable as law.' 28 In the North Sea Continental
Shelf case, the ICJ stated that the adjudicator did not face "a question of
23. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.I. 554, 567-68 (Dec. 22).
24. La compdtence du juge international en 9quit9, 40 ANNUAIRE 271 (L'Institut de Droit
International) (1937) (explaining that the consideration of equity is "normalement inhirente b une
saine application du droit").
25. Id. ("[Lie juge international ne peut s 'inspirer de l'dquitj pour rendre sa sentence, sans
Otre lid par le droit en vigueur, que si toutes les parties donnent une autorisation claire et expresse a
cette fin."); see also Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 677, 730-35 (Andreas Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006). Early arbitral tribu-
nals, however, displayed a propensity for intermingling considerations of law and equity in deciding
cases. See Louis B. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 108 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 42-45 (1963). The construction of ICJ Article 38 also argues strongly against a court's
consideration of equity contra or praeter legem absent party consent. See CHRISTOPHER R. Rossi,
EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING 87-88 (1993). Judge Higgins has stated the prohibition less categorically, offering simply
that equity is "unlikely to provide ... a satisfactory basis for decision." Rosalyn Higgins, Interna-
tional Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes: General Course on Public
hiternational Law, 230 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 286 (1991).
26. See, e.g., Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351,
390-91 (Sept. 11); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 567 (Dec. 22); Delimita-
tion of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Me. Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 278 (Oct. 12);
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Dist. of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 10 (Dec.
6).
27. Louis B. Sohn, Arbitration of Ilternational Disputes Ex aequo et bono, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 330, 332-33 (Pieter Sanders ed.,
1967). This acquiescence can be expressed using different treaty language; in the Samoan Claims
case, the parties authorized the arbitrator to decide the case according to "the principles of interna-
tional law or ... equity." Samoan Claims (Ger., Gr.Brit., U.S.), 9 R.I.A.A. 15, 21 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1902). In the Naomi Russell case, the parties indicated that equitable principles were to be applied
by stipulating that "'responsibility shall not be fixed according to the generally accepted rules and
principles of international law.'" Naomi Russell (U.S. v. Mex), 4 R.I.A.A. 805, 829 (Mex.-U.S.
Special Claims Comm'n 1931) (separate opinion of Comm'r Nielsen).
28. Cont'l Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 60 (Feb. 24); see also Frontier Dispute,
1986 I.C.J. at 633; Cont'l Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 38-40 (June 3).
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applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule
of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles."29 In
these cases, the immediate rule of law being applied is the customary inter-
national law of border delimitations, which in turn directs tribunals to apply
equity in resolving border disputes. The result is that equity controls through
application of a sort of renvoi provision under customary international law
whereby an adjudicator applying the customary international law of mari-
time delimitations finds that the governing legal regime contains a choice ofS • 30
law provision that requires the application of equitable principles. The au-
thority of the customary renvoi rule requires support in the same manner as
any other rule under international law: either the consent of the parties or
through its incorporation as binding customary law supported by opinio ju-
ris and state practice."
B. Differentiating the Additive from the Restrictive Interpretation
of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions
In the BIT context, tribunals employing an additive interpretation of fair
and equitable treatment language may refer to equitable principles in devel-
oping the applicable rule of decision, while a restrictive approach limits the
role of equity to that of a general principle or background norm of interpre-
tation. Fair and equitable treatment provisions under an additive
interpretation fulfill a similar role with regard to investor-host-state rela-
tions as opinio juris and state practice do under the law of border
delimitations: subject to the specific treaty terms, such provisions can em-
power judges to rule on host-state conduct drawing directly from general
principles of fairness and equity." Thus tribunals interpreting fair and equi-
29. N. Sea Cont'l Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,47 (Feb. 20).
30. Black's Law Dictionary defines renvoi as "[t]he doctrine under which a court in resorting
to foreign law adopts as well the foreign law's conflict-of-laws principles." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1324 (8th ed. 2004). In the case of maritime delimitations, of course, the tribunal could never
be said to be "resorting to foreign law" but rather only to be applying the governing international
law. Nevertheless, the application of the governing intenational law can have implications for the
choice of legal rule that operate not unlike the concept of renvoi, although the analogy is admittedly
imperfect.
31. N. Sea Cont'l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 46 (noting that the application of equitable principles
has "from the beginning reflected the opinio juris in the matter of delimitation"). In international
law, a norm is said to bind states as a matter of customary international law if there is sufficient state
practice to demonstrate that a consensus exists regarding the norm as an international legal obliga-
tion. The notion that states comply with the norm because they perceive an international legal
obligation to do so is known as opinio juris. Under ICJ Article 38 1(b), both state practice and
opinio juris must be shown in order for a norm to apply as a matter of customary international law.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 6-10; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-84 (5th ed.
2003); Pellet, supra note 25, at 749-59.
32. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 262; Charles H. Brower, I, Structure, Legiti-
mac), and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 66 n.163 (2003); EA.
Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 24 1,
243 (1981); Muchlinski, supra note 20, at 531-32; Suzuki, supra note 3, at 679. As the tribunal in
PSEG Global stated, the fair and equitable treatment provision allows "for justice to be done in the
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table treatment provisions independent of the minimum standard have given
the words extremely broad purchase in accord with their ordinary meaning.
Given that states conclude BITs for the purpose of encouraging investment,
under an additive interpretation, "fair and equitable treatment should be un-
derstood to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to
fostering the promotion of foreign investment."" Accordingly, tribunals have
found that fair and equitable treatment provisions in BITs obligate govern-
ments to maintain transparency; due process; judicial propriety; nonarbitrary
conduct; good faith; and, most commonly, fulfillment of legitimate investor
expectations and maintenance of a stable legal and business framework in
their relations with investors.34 These duties extend well beyond a state's
obligations towards aliens under customary international law.35
In contrast, if the applicable standard of equitable treatment is coexten-
sive with or limited to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, an
adjudicator may not employ equity as a rule of decision but rather must
judge host-state compliance with customary international law. In its capacity
as a general principle operating infra legem, equity will temper the applica-
tion of the minimum standard, but adjudicators will not base their decisions
on equitable considerations: only a state's violation of the minimum stan-
dard will suffice to grant an investor the right to recover. On this view, the
state has not assumed a binding international obligation to treat foreign ir.-
vestors equitably; rather the obligation to provide fair and equitable
treatment adheres only within the scope of a state's preexisting customary
obligations.
NAFTA tribunals following the FTC interpretive note limiting the appli-
cation of fair and equitable treatment within the bounds of the minimum
standard have disregarded the jurisprudence of NAFTA tribunals convened
prior to the note that adopted an additive approach to fair and equitable
treatment. 36 NAFTA tribunals convened after the issuance of the FTC's note
found that it permits the interpretation of the international minimum stan-
dard in light of the general principles of fairness and equity but not the
absence of the more traditional breaches of international law standards." PSEG Global Inc. v.
Turkey, Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 239 (ICSID Jan. 19, 2007).
33. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, Case No. ARB o1/, Award, para. 113
(ICSID May 25, 2004); see also Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments
on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251,341 (1997); Suzuki, supra note 3, at 679.
34. See Bamali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297, 302-316 (2005).
35. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 505 ("[I]t is not possible to postulate an international
minimum standard which in effect supports a particular philosophy of economic life at the expense
of the host state."); SHAW, supra note 31, at 734-37; VAN HARTEN, supra note 3, at 88 ("[A] state's
misconduct must be of a very serious nature before it violates the customary standard."); J.C.
Thomas, Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence of Com-
mentators, 17 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 21, 29 (2002) ("The consistent theme in the
present day commentary is that the minimum standard is not stringent.").
36. The Loewen tribunal made explicit the fact that it did not look to, among others, the Pope
& Talbot, Inc. award of April 10, 2001, to inform its discussion of fair and equitable treatment.




development of an independent standard of fair and equitable treatment out-
side the minimum standard. 37 The Waste Management tribunal synthesized
this view with the holdings of other NAFTA tribunals regarding the applica-
ble international minimum standard in articulating an ineloquently labeled,
NAFTA-specific "minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable
treatment."38 This standard would be breached in cases where "conduct at-
tributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary,
grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the
claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process
leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety.' 39 This articulation
of the minimum standard is noticeably less aggressive than that developed
by the tribunals applying an additive approach. As such, it seems a credible
summation of the protections that investors can expect to receive under cur-
rent customary international law.4°
C. Converging on a Bad Idea
Thus far this Note has laid out two possible approaches to interpreting a
BIT's fair and equitable treatment provision. Ad hoc tribunals convened pur-
suant to BIT dispute resolution clauses have developed an additive
interpretation of the provisions that disciplines a wide variety of state action.
NAFTA tribunals, on the other hand, have restricted the application of the
provision within the scope of preexisting customary obligations based on
the FTC interpretive note. A third group, also composed of ad hoc tribunals,
has adopted a different approach that this Note has labeled the "convergence
approach." These tribunals consider the customary minimum standard to be
equal to the fair and equitable treatment standard but do not follow the ex-
ample of the NAFIA tribunals in reading the fair and equitable treatment
obligation as merely reflecting the role of equity as a general principle in-
forming the application of the customary minimum standard. Rather, under
the convergence approach, tribunals claim that customary international law
has evolved such that the customary minimum standard requires that alien
investors receive fair and equitable treatment as defined by tribunals adopt-
ing an additive interpretation of the standard. 4' These tribunals have based
the contention that customary international law and the independent inter-
37. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, paras. 118-20
(ICSID Oct. 11, 2002); see also ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1. Award,
paras. 183-85 (ICSID Jan. 9, 2003). The formulations of the applicable standard in Mondev and
ADF Group are in turn referenced in Waste Management. Waste Management, Inc. v. United
Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, paras. 91-96 (ICSID April 30, 2004).
38. Waste Management, Inc., Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, para. 98.
39. Id. paras. 91-96; see also Loewen Group, Inc., Case No. ARB (AF) 98/3, para. 132; ADF
Group Inc., Case No. ARB(AF)/00/I, para. 190; Mondev Int'l, Ltd., Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, para.
115; Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, para. 194 (UNCITRAL Jan.
36, 2006).
40. See supra note 35.
41. See Westcott, supra note 14, at 429-30.
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pretation of treaty-based standards of treatment have converged on inaccu-
rate or careless readings of previous tribunals, leading to confusion
regarding the substantive content of customary international law.
The convergence approach allows tribunals to dodge the question of
whether to interpret fair and equitable treatment provisions as additive or
equal to the minimum standard under customary international law simply by
asserting that whatever protections would lie under an additive interpretation
of fair and equitable treatment provisions apply simply as a matter of cus-
tomary international law. 42 The flaw of the convergence approach is that the
tribunals that employ it do not attempt to discern an independent interna-
tional minimum standard that would meet the requirements of opinio juris
and state practice. Instead they "cross the streams" by looking to the juris-
prudence of tribunals that have applied an additive interpretation of fair and
equitable treatment provisions contained in treaties. The tribunals in CMS43
and Occidental," for example, relied on the Tecmed tribunal's articulation of
the fair and equitable treatment standard,45 which both CMS and Occidental
subsequently pronounced to be binding as a matter of customary interna-
tional law.46 Yet the Tecmed tribunal stated that "the scope of the undertaking
of fair and equitable treatment under [the Treaty] described above is that
resulting from an autonomous interpretation."4 In other words, the Tecmed
tribunal went out of its way to clarify that the standard it was enunciating
was not customary international law but rather a conventional standard
based on a reading of the specific terms of the treaty that applied only as
between the two parties. Tecmed tried to warn future tribunals not to cross
the streams.
Customary international law does evolve, however, and some make the
case that international law in the investment context is currently growing so
as to include a fair and equitable treatment requirement. 48 Still, tribunals
adopting the convergence approach make no attempt to prove that custom-
ary international law requires fair and equitable treatment at the level
applied by those tribunals adopting an additive approach.49 The assertion
42. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, para.
284 (ICSID May 12, 2005); Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No
UN3467, Final Award, para. 188 (London Ct. of Int'l Arb. July 1,2004).
43. CMS Gas Transmission Co., Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 279.
44. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., Case No UN3467, paras. 185-86.
45. T~cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 154 (ICSID May 29, 2003).
46. CMS Gas Transmission Co., Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 284; Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co., Case No UN3467, para. 190.
47. Tdcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, para. 155 (emphasis
added).
48. See Steffen Hindelang, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy hivestment
Climate: The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary' International Law Revisited, 5 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 789 (2004). But see Porterfield, supra note 9, at 79.
49. Porterfield, supra note 9, at 81-82. Porterfield states that the assertions "have never been
supported by any comprehensive empirical study of the actual practice of nations with regard to
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that the fair and equitable treatment provision and customary international
law are coextensive usually falls into a single line of the award. In Occiden-
tal, the tribunal simply stated that it was "of the opinion that.., the Treaty
standard is not different from that required under international law.' 50 Treaty
language can effectively subsume the application of fair and equitable
treatment within the limits of customary international law in some circum-
stances: the FTC interpretive note accomplishes exactly this. But when a
tribunal understands a treaty to apply only within the bounds of customary
international law, as the Occidental tribunal did, it should not then look to
tribunals applying an additive interpretation of fair and equitable treatment
to determine the applicable standard.5
By crossing the streams, tribunals couple the view that the customary
minimum standard requires fair and equitable treatment with the expansive
scope of investor rights protected under an additive interpretation of fair and
equitable treatment. This approach leads tribunals to the inevitable, but un-
tenable, conclusion that as a matter of customary law, states owe duties to
foreign corporations, including the maintenance of stable, predictable, and
transparent regulatory environments that do not frustrate the legitimate ex-
pectations of the foreign investors." Such a conclusion overstates the
protections afforded to investors under customary international law.53 If the
foreign investment." Id. This regrettable fact may be symptomatic of the development of interna-
tional investment law into a regime unto itself. As Bruno Simma points out, once a field of
international law comes to constitute a discrete regime of its own, there is "an unavoidable tendency
on the part of the scholarship ... to somehow 'decouple' itself from the body of general theory on
which it is (and remains) based." Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General Interna-
tional Law: A Comparative Analysis, in 4 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN
LAW 153, 164 (1993). For an study rejecting the idea that BITs have created new customary interna-
tional law in the field of investor protection, see Abdullah Al Faruque, Creating Customary
International Law Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 44 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 292 (2004).
50. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., Case No UN3467, para. 190. The statement in
CMS is no less conclusory. The tribunal held that "the Treaty Standard of fair and equitable treat-
ment and its connection with the required stability and predictability of the business environment,
founded on solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different from the international law
minimum standard and its evolution under customary law." CMS Gas Transmission Co., Case No.
ARB/01/8, para. 284.
51. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., Case No UN3467, para. 188.
52. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Award, para. 365 (ICSID July 14, 2006); CMS
Gas Transmission Co., Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 284; Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., Case
No UN3467, para. 191.
53. ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, para. 183 (ICSID
Jan. 9, 2003) (stating that the tribunal was "not convinced that the Investor ha[d] shown the exis-
tence, in current customary international law, of a general and autonomous requirement ... to
accord fair and equitable treatment . . . to foreign investments"); BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 503
(noting "the tendency of writers and tribunals to give the international standard a too ambitious
content"); VAN HARTEN, supra note 3, at 89 (stating with regard to the decision in CMS that the
tribunal's depiction of the protections afforded under customary international law was "nothing
short of adventurous"). Judge Rosalyn Higgins would have been "surprised" if the ICJ were to have
found that a customary rule of international law applied requiring the application of equitable prin-
ciples in the ELSI case in which it dealt with the minimum standard. Higgins, supra note 25, at 287.
One commentator makes a powerful argument against the legitimacy of any articulation of the
minimum standard of treatment as a customary norm of international law. The fact that tribunals
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convergence tribunals are correct, then government actions that have been
found to breach fair and equitable treatment provisions, including negli-
gence in negotiations,4 approval of investment that is contrary toS 56
government policy," discrimination in the provision of financial assistance,
and simple breaches of contract, would all be violations of customary inter-
national law.
The notion that the applicable standard under customary international
law is less burdensome than that which applies under an additive approach
to fair and equitable treatment provisions finds support in the jurisprudence
of the ICJ. Although the ICJ acknowledges that states do owe certain duties
with regard to the treatment of foreign investment,5 the scope of these pro-
tections is exceedingly narrow in comparison with the additive interpretation
of fair and equitable treatment provisions. When the ICJ had the opportunity
to comment on the duty to treat aliens in a nonarbitrary fashion, a duty sub-
sumed within the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment, it stated
that "[a]rbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as
something opposed to the rule of law.... It is a wilful disregard of due
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical
propriety."58 On this view, in order to constitute a violation of customary
international law, a state's arbitrary action must function as a "substitute"
for the rule of law; simple negligence will not constitute an offense.5 9
In support of their adventurous claims regarding the content of custom-
ary international law, tribunals have adapted the history of fair and equitable
treatment to suit their purposes. For example, the Azurix and Siemens tribu-
nals both claimed that in its seminal 1927 Neer decision, the U.S. Mexican
Mixed Claims Commission ("MCC") was applying its understanding of the
requirements of the fair and equitable treatment standard as it then stood
under customary international law.6° In Neer, however, the MCC was in no
consistently overlook actual state practice in this area is a fundamental flaw in the articulation of the
purported customary international minimum standard. Porterfield, supra note 9, at 103-04.
54. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 246 (ICSID
Jan. 19, 2007).
55. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, para. 166
(ICSID May 25, 2004).
56. Saluka Invs. B. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras. 347, 466 (UNCITRAL March
16, 2006).
57. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). The
Court observed that "[wihen a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals,
whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and as-
sumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them." Id.
58. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 76 (July 20).
59. Id.
60. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 289 (ICSID Feb.
6, 2007) (stating that the Commission in Neer offered a "description of conduct in breach of the fair
and equitable treatment standard ... as the expression of customary international law at that time");
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 365 (ICSID July 14, 2006)
(stating that the Commission in Neer "considered... that a State has breached the fair and equitable
treatment obligation when the conduct of the State could be described as outrageous, egregious or in
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way concerned with articulating a standard of fair and equitable treatment. 6I
While some notion of equitable treatment existed within international eco-
nomic law at the time, the obligation applied only as a matter of treaty
commitment; the idea that a state owed a customary duty to treat foreign
investors equitably would have been utterly alien to the MCC.62 The MCC
understood its task primarily in terms of adapting the international delict of
"denial of justice," which most international lawyers previously thought
could be committed only by courts, to the actions of a state's executive or
legislative branches.63 The MCC held that certain standards of conduct apply
equally to the judicial as well as the political branches of government, but in
articulating the international standard to which governments are held, the
MCC made no mention of fairness or equity, much less in the capacity of a
binding obligation.6 To the contrary, the MCC's test, which effectively re-quires the government to affect an outrage or willful neglect, makes it clear
bad faith or so below international standards that a reasonable and impartial person would readily
recognize it as such").
61. I am joined in this conclusion by Sir Robert Jennings. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,
Award, 41 I.L.M. 1347, para. 61 n.49 (NAFIA May 31, 2002). The tribunal in ADF also observes
that Neer concerned a quite different set of legal and factual matters such that there is "no logical
necessity and no concordant state practice to support the view that the Neer formulation is automati-
cally extendible to the contemporary context of treatment of foreign investors." ADF Group Inc. v.
United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, para. 181 (ICSID Jan. 9, 2003). Nevertheless, be-
cause I have plainly stated that the tribunal misrepresents the Neer case, it is appropriate that I offer
the relevant text on which the reader may judge my claim. The paragraph in which the Neer Com-
mission sets out the applicable standard follows in its entirety:
The Commission recognizes the difficulty of devising a general formula for determining the
boundary between an international delinquency of this type and an unsatisfactory use of power
included in national sovereignty. In 1910 John Bassett Moore observed that he did "not con-
sider it to be practicable to lay down in advance precise and unyielding formulas by which the
question of a denial of justice may in every instance be determined" (American Journal of In-
ternational Law, 1910, p. 787), and in 1923 De Lapradelle and Politis stated that the evasive
and complex character (le caractre fuyant et complexe) of a denial of justice seems to defy
any definition (Recueil des Arbitrages Intemationaux, 11, 1923, p. 280). It is immaterial
whether the expression "denial of justice" be taken in that broad sense in which it applies to
acts of executive and legislative authorities as well as to acts of the courts, or whether it be
used in a narrow sense which confines it to acts of judicial authorities only; for in the latter
case a reasoning, identical to that which-under the name of "denial of justice"-applies to
acts of the judiciary, will apply--be it under a different name-to unwarranted acts of execu-
tive and legislative authorities. Without attempting to announce a precise formula, it is in the
opinion of the Commission possible to go a little further than the authors quoted, and to hold
(first) that the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international stan-
dards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful [sic] neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reason-
able and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency
proceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the
country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international standards is immaterial.
L.F.H. Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, para. 4 (Mex.-U.S. Gen.
Claims Comm'n 1926).
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. Neer, 4 R.I.A.A., para. 4.; cf Chattin v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 282, para.
5-11 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 47 (2005).
64. Neer, 4 R.I.A.A., paras. 4-5.
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that the minimum standard falls well short of requiring fair and equitable
treatment.
Three disputes that reached award in 2007, however, have reversed the
"trend towards finding no real difference between the two standards., 65 The
two most recent cases, Enron and Vivendi, invoked the VCLT in support of
reading fair and equitable treatment provisions as additive to the customary
baseline. 6 The tribunal in Vivendi went so far as to conclude that the con-
vergence approach is "obsolete. 67 The diligence of these tribunals in
maintaining a clear distinction between customary international law and the
individual treaty regimes is encouraging and hopefully indicative of a "new
trend." Part II argues that this new trend is in fact in keeping with the evolu-
tion of fair and equitable treatment as a concept in international economic
law that traces its roots back to the League of Nations.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT AS AN
INDEPENDENT STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part provides historical support for the rejection of the convergence
approach to the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment clauses by
demonstrating that fair and equitable treatment evolved as a treaty-based
standard independent of the obligations imposed under the minimum stan-
dard for treatment of aliens under customary international law. Section II.A
examines the development of the concept beginning with its appearance in
the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations up to the Economic Agreement
of Bogotd, concluded just after the Havana Charter. It argues that during this
time, the obligation to provide equitable treatment applied over and above
states' obligations under customary law. Section II.B examines the circum-
stances surrounding the emergence of fair and equitable treatment as a
prominent provision in the OECD's Draft Conventions on the Protection of
Foreign Property, which served as a model for many subsequently negoti-
ated BITs, and concludes that customary international law imposed no
obligation on states to provide fair and equitable treatment at the time of the
OECD Draft Conventions.
A. The Birth of Fair and Equitable Treatment as an
Independent Standard of International Law
While the 1948 Havana Charter for the abortive International Trade
Organization is popularly credited as the original source of the now
65. Westcott, supra note 14, at 430. The fact that Westcott's observation came in June 2007
demonstrates the dynamic nature of the issue. The three awards are Compania de Aguas del Acon-
quija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (ICSID Aug. 20, 2007); Enron Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (ICSID May 22, 2007); and PSEG Global Inc. v.
Turkey, Case No. ARB/02/5, Award (ICSID Jan. 19, 2007).
66. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A., Case No. ARB/97/3, paras. 7.4.2-7.4.5; Enron
Corp., Case No. ARB/O 1/3, para. 259.
67. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A., Case No. ARB/97/3, para. 7.4.46.
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ubiquitous fair and equitable treatment treaty provision,68 the history of the
concept of equitable treatment under international economic law dates back
at least to the League of Nations Covenant. Article 23(e) of the Covenant
contains a provision committing its members "to secure and maintain ...
equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League."69 In
light of the fact that no "accepted rules or certain principles of international
law" governed the treatment of foreign commerce, much less required the
provision of equitable treatment, the League convened an International Con-
ference on the Treatment of Foreigners to develop an applicable standard of
treatment under Article 23(e).70
The Conference articulated a standard that raised the bar well above
previous formulations of the customary minimum standard by proscribing,
among other practices, "arbitrary fiscal treatment," "unjust discrimination,"
and generally all "unjust or oppressive treatment by one Member of the
League of persons, firms and companies of another Member carrying on
business ... within its territories., 7 ' The standard that the Conference ulti-
mately developed was necessarily vague: it considered the attempt to "frame
a definition of 'equitable treatment'" to be a "barren academic labour.
' 72
Despite this indeterminacy, however, the Conference's view of the applica-
ble standard under equitable treatment, in providing broad protection against
arbitrary and unjust treatment, was easily discernible from the classic articu-
lation of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under international
law given in the Neer case, which required malicious intent or shocking be-
73
havior. According to the Conference's formulation, states under an
obligation to provide equitable treatment owed a greater duty of care vis-A-
vis foreign investors than they would if only the customary minimum stan-
dard applied. Thus equitable treatment had an additive nature under the
League of Nations Covenant.
In 1928, the League prepared a Draft Convention on the Treatment of
Foreigners pursuant to Article 23 of the Covenant that reconfirmed the lim-
68. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liabil-
ity, para. 124 n.29 (ICSID Oct. 3, 2006); 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3, at
211; U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., supra note 5, at 12; Dolzer, supra note 2, at 89
n.12; Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD INVEST-
MENT & TRADE 357, 357 (2005); Thomas, supra note 35, at 40; Yannaca-Small, supra note 5, at 3.
Westcott goes so far as to claim that "[t]he first known reference to 'equitable treatment' appears in
the draft Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization." Westcott, supra note 14, at 410
n. 10. This is inaccurate.
69. League of Nations Covenant art. 23(e); see also MARTIN HILL, THE ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 18-20 (1946) (discussing the origin of
Article 23(e)). For a brief discussion of the state of international law with regard to investments
prior to the First World War, see LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 391-92.
70. Pitman B. Potter, International Legislation on the Treatment of Foreigners, 24 AM. J.
INT'L L. 748, 750 (1930).
71. Repon Presented to the Assembly from the Economic and Financial Organisation 16,
League of Nations Doc. A.59.1922.11 (1922).
72. Id. at 14.
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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ited protections afforded under customary international law at the time.74
Article 16 of the League's Draft Convention governed the treatment of for-
eign companies but mentioned neither fair and equitable treatment nor any
noncontingent international minimum standard. The League proposal did
not guarantee any protection in excess of that afforded under host-state mu-
nicipal law, providing in Article 16.6 that the Members "agree not to
prejudice acquired rights unless forced to do so, and consequently not to
cancel an authorisation once given except for an infraction of the laws and
regulations of the country.' 75 Members tolerated restrictive measures so long
as they complied with the principle of reciprocity.76 In terms of investor pro-
tection, the League's Draft Convention represented a regression from the
Covenant's broad commitment to equitable treatment to little more than a
platitude: states were not to violate investor's rights unless "forced to do
so."" The League Draft Convention, however, did not purport to reproduce
the Covenant's exhortation to equitable treatment in a legally binding docu-
ment. 78 Nevertheless, capital-exporting states welcomed even the Draft
Convention's provisions as an improvement over the minimal preexisting
protections under international law.79
Perhaps having learned from the League's failure to define the substan-
tive protections afforded by equitable treatment, the negotiators of the next
major multilateral agreement on investment, the 1948 Havana Charter of the
abortive ITO, drew a distinction between "unreasonable or unjustifiable ac-
tion" and "just and equitable treatment." Article l l(l)(b) of the Havana
Charter prohibited states from taking "unreasonable or unjustifiable action"
against the property or interests of foreign investors, while Article 11(2) of
the Havana Charter empowered the ITO to promote international agree-
ments designed "to assure just and equitable treatment" for investors in host
states.80
74. See Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, League of Nations Doc.
C.174.M.53.1928.11 (1928).
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id. at 13.
78. This is symptomatic of a broader phenomenon. Until the advent of the Abs-Shawcross
Draft convention, commentators did not seem to imagine equitable treatment as constituting a non-
contingent standard of treatment in contradistinction from national or most-favored-nation
treatment. See John Ward Cutler, The Treatment of Foreigners in Relation to the Draft Convention
and Conference of 1929, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 233-36 (1933); Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for
the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 229, 229 (1956).
79. See Cutler, supra note 78, at 233-35.
80. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 11, Mar. 24, 1948, in U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & EMPLOYMENT, FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 8-9, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf. 2/78, U.N. Sales No. 1948.I1.D.4 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter]. For an overview of
the Havana Conference, see Robert R. Wilson, Editorial Comment, Proposed ITO Charter, 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 879 (1947). The Havana Charter provision on just and equitable treatment was largely
unaltered from the August 22, 1947, Draft Charter for the International Trade Organization of the
United Nations. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DRAFT CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONs, Dep't of State Pub. 2927, Com. Pol'y Series 106 (1947).
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The travaux preparatoires of the Charter reveal both the parties' intent
to increase investor protection through treaty and the meager protections
afforded to investors under customary international law at the time. Even the
text of Article 1 l(1)(b) prohibiting "unreasonable or unjustifiable action"
injurious to the investments of foreign nationals renders obligatory a lower
standard of protection than that which would be applicable under a require-
ment to provide equitable treatment." The parties' intention that Article
1 I(1)(b) be a binding provision and the drafting history of the Charter reveal
that even the prohibition on unreasonable injurious action was not a preex-
isting obligation under the international minimum standard.82 In the first
draft, known as the New York Draft, Article 12 of the Charter provided that
"not only will [Members] conform to the provisions of their relevant inter-
national obligations now in effect ... but also ... in general they will take
no unreasonable action injurious to the interests of such other Members,
business entities or persons."83 Thus the negative obligation to abstain from
unreasonable injurious action, an obligation much weaker in substance than
that imposed by a requirement of fair and equitable treatment, would be
binding only as a treaty obligation to other members under the Havana
Charter and not as a codification of existing customary international law.
The language of the Draft Charter adopted by the Second Session, the so-
called Geneva Draft, solidifies this view by placing the obligation to refrain
from unreasonable injurious action in an instrumental context. The parties
agreed to accept the obligation "[i]n order to stimulate and assure the provi-
sion and exchange of facilities for industrial and general economic
development." 84 Under this formulation, the prohibition against unreason-
able injurious action is a means to an end that binds states based on their
assent, not the rule's independent status as a general principle.
The final text of the Havana Charter also demonstrates that the obliga-
tion to provide just and equitable treatment could not have been a
preexisting requirement under customary international law. The prohibition
on "unreasonable or unjustifiable action" has the character of a responsibil-
ity incumbent upon the states party, while just and equitable treatment is an
aspirational goal that the ITO has the power to achieve only by making rec-
ommendations and promoting further agreements. Because the Havana
Charter drew clear distinctions between responsibilities that the parties must
perform and grants of authority to the ITO, the Charter plainly did not view
the requirement to provide equitable treatment as incumbent upon parties,
81. Mann, supra note 32, at 243.
82. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Employment, First Session of the Preparatory Commit-
tee, London, Eng., Oct. 15- Nov. 26, 1946, Report of the First Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 8, 28, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 1946) [hereinafter Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee].
83. Id. at 28.
84. U.N. Conference on Trade & Employment, Second Session of the Preparatory Commit-
tee, Geneva, Switz., Apr. 10, 1947, Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, 12,
U.N. Doc. E/PCfIT/186 (Sept. 10, 1947).
85. 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 3, at 218.
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whether as a treaty obligation or as a general principle of international law.86
Nevertheless, the states gathered at Havana could not agree even on this
level of investor protection, among other issues, and the Havana Charter
never entered into force. To the extent that the fair and equitable treatment
standard enters into popular usage by virtue of the oft-cited Havana Charter,
it does so in a hortatory capacity and not as a requirement under customary
international law.
Two months after the adoption of the final text of the Havana Charter,
the Economic Agreement of Bogotd, drafted by the Ninth International Con-
ference of American States, which also produced the Charter of the
Organization of American States ("OAS"), repeated the call for equitable
treatment. Specifically, Article 22 of the Bogot6 Agreement provides that
"[floreign capital shall receive equitable treatment. The States therefore
agree not to take unjustified, unreasonable or discriminatory measures that
would impair the legally acquired rights or interests of nationals of other
countries in the enterprises, capital, skills, arts or technology they have sup-
plied."87
The BogotA Agreement's aggregation of the two Havana Charter stan-
dards into a single equitable treatment standard is consistent with the
assertion that the drafters of both documents understood the requirement to
provide equitable treatment as additive to a state's duties toward aliens un-
der customary international law. In attempting to define the legal
consequences flowing from the obligation to provide equitable treatment,
the Bogot6 Agreement differed from the Havana Charter. The Bogotd
Agreement abandoned the Havana Charter's careful distinction between the
prohibition on unjustified action on the one hand and the exhortation to pro-
vide equitable treatment on the other. But the Bogoti Agreement confirmed
the fact that states are not bound by a customary duty to treat alien investors
with reference to an international standard of fair and equitable treatment.
The Bogota Agreement's approach to the substantive obligation to provide
equitable treatment is consistent with that of the Havana Charter with regard
to the relationship between treaty-based obligations and the customary
minimum standard. Under the BogotSi Agreement, the obligation to provide
equitable treatment necessarily includes a prohibition on unjustified action,
which coheres with the hierarchy of obligations and exhortations contained
in the Havana Charter.
86. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GENEVA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION: A COMMENTARY, Dep't of State Pub. 2950, Com. Pol'y Series 107 at I I (1947). The Havana
Charter's drafters viewed the prohibition on unreasonable actions as providing "the minimum secu-
rity of private international investment" while the promotion of fair and equitable treatment falls
under the ITO's authority to "promote international agreement on further principles relating to . ..
foreign investment." Id. at 13.
87. Organization of American States, Economic Agreement of BogotA, art. 22, May 2, 1948,
L. Treaty Ser. No. 25, OAS Doc. No. OEA/Ser.A/4 (SEPF).
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B. The OECD Draft Convention and the Status of Fair and Equitable
Treatment under International Law
This Section argues that the evolution of fair and equitable treatment as
an international legal concept, taking into account other multilateral instru-
ments for investor protection, militates against the view that customary
international law imposes, or imposed at the time of the OECD Draft Con-
ventions, an obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. Proponents
of imposing an obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment under cus-
tomary international law find support in commentary to the 1962 and 1967
OECD Draft Conventions on the Protection of Foreign Property that pur-
ported to ground the fair and equitable treatment requirement in customary
international law." While the OECD Draft Conventions were a principal
model for the text of subsequent BITs,89 the OECD is invested with no spe-
cial power to make customary international law in this area.
In the wake of the failure of previous multilateral efforts involving de-
veloped and developing countries to agree upon a treaty providing for
investor protection, the OECD seized the opportunity to produce a model
convention that attempted to stretch the bounds of customary international
law as reflected in the preceding instruments by asserting that the fair and
equitable treatment concept was embodied in "customary" international
law.9° The OECD Draft Convention, based in large part on the 1959
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 9' crystallized the
formulation of "fair and equitable treatment" and contributed to the provi-S - 92
sion's ubiquity. The impact of the OECD Draft Convention still
reverberates: the tribunal in Pope & Talbot cited the OECD Draft Conven-
tion's identification of a fair and equitable treatment requirement as support
for the adoption of the convergence approach.93 The legal impact of the
88. Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property, art. I cmt., adopted Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M. 117 [hereinafter OECD Draft Conven-
tion]. The provisions of the 1967 Draft Convention with regard to fair and equitable treatment,
including the commentary thereto, are identical to those contained in the 1962 OECD Draft Conven-
tion. Throughout this Note, only the 1967 OECD Draft Convention will be cited. For the text of the
1962 OECD Draft Convention, see Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property, 1962, 2 I.L.M. 241.
89. MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26 (2007); VAN HARTEN, supra note 3, at 21.
90. OECD Draft Convention, supra note 88, art. I cmt. 4.
91. Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 9 J. PUB. L. 116 (1960) [hereinafter
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention]. The work of Abs and Shawcross stimulated the OECD to de-
velop its Draft Convention. Indeed, the OECD Draft Convention was developed based on the text of
the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention. See Thomas, supra note 35, at 46.
92. See OECD Draft Convention, supra note 88, art. 1(a); see also Antonio R. Parra, Appli-
cable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Investment Treaties, 16 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 20, 22 (2001).
93. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award, 41 I.L.M. 1347, paras. 60 (NAFTA May 31,
2002). The tribunal acknowledged, however, that the OECD Draft Convention "did not rest upon an
effort to discern the ingredients of international law but upon an independent consideration of how
host countries should treat foreign owned property." Nevertheless, the tribunal accepted the OECD's
characterization of fair and equitable treatment.
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OECD Draft Convention's requirement that "[e]ach Party shall at all times
ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of the
other Parties" is therefore fundamental to understanding the evolution of fair
and equitable treatment.
94
Under the OECD Draft Convention, the requirement to provide fair and
equitable treatment was an affirmative obligation that bound states inde-
pendent of its existence as a treaty obligation by virtue of its status as a rule
of customary international law. In contrast to every previous multilateral
effort to articulate a standard of fair and equitable treatment, the OECD was
careful to craft its fair and equitable treatment requirement in terms of pre-
existing obligations under customary international law. The commentaries to
Article I of the OECD Draft Convention state that the requirement to pro-
vide fair and equitable treatment is a rule that flows from the "well-
established general principle of international law" requiring a state "to re-
spect and protect the property of nationals of other States."' Under this
view, "[t]he standard required conforms in effect to the 'minimum standard'
which forms part of customary international law.' 96 This characterization of
fair and equitable treatment is a significant departure from previous multi-
lateral conventions.
Although general principles have been invoked with similar scant docu-
mentation, 97 the Draft Convention's approach is troubling to the extent that it
overstates the role that equity plays as a general principle of international
law9s and purports to identify a customary international legal obligation toaccord fair and equitable treatment. 9 As previously discussed, the direct
94. OECD Draft Convention, supra note 88, art. l(a). The requirement to provide fair and
equitable treatment was also included in the first article of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention.
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, supra note 91. Nevertheless, the focus of the analysis will be on
the OECD Draft Convention since this document has received more attention from recent tribunals.
95. OECD Draft Convention, supra note 88, art. I cmt. l. Note that the general principle
invoked is not one that the drafters maintain is common to the legal systems of all nations but rather
one that inheres in the international legal order. See Riccardo Monaco, Observations sur la hi6rar-
chie des sources du droit international, in VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUNG, INTERNATIONALE
GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE 599, 602 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1983).
96. OECD Draft Convention, supra note 88, art. I cmt.4.
97. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, para. 218, at 113-14 (June 27) (stating that the general principles of general international
humanitarian law were related to the Geneva Conventions but were not coextensive with the Con-
ventions); Reservations to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Conven-
tion] (stating the "generally recognized principle that a multilateral convention is the result of an
agreement freely concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none of the contracting parties is
entitled to frustrate or impair ... the purpose and raison d'9tre of the convention"); Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (April 9) (stating that Albania owed obligations under the "general
and well-recognized principles [of] elementary considerations of humanity ... the principle of the
freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its terri-
tory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States" without further elucidation).
98. See supra Part l.A.
99. If, on the other hand, the OECD Draft Convention and Commentary intended simply to
state that equity, in its capacity as a general principle or background norm of international law, plays
a role in determining whether a state has breached the minimum standard, the result is neither
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application of equitable principles as a rule of law requires the same adop-
tion process as any other source of international law: states must voluntarily
assent to the rule or the rule must apply as a matter of customary interna-
tional law.'0° At the time when both the Abs-Shawcross and OECD Draft
Conventions were promulgated, there does not appear to have been anything
approaching a uniform recognition that international law required host states
to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors. A West German effort to
draft a multilateral instrument for investor protection in 1950 attempted "to
resuscitate ... the principle of inviolability of private property" that pre-
sumably lacked legal force at the time.' °' In 1960, the inclusion of equitable
treatment as a requirement under the minimum standard was considered
"imaginative."
02
The claim in both the Abs-Shawcross and OECD Draft Conventions that
the general principles of international law compel a state to accord investors
fair and equitable treatment is a mere assertion devoid of the state practice
and opinio juris necessary to prove a customary rule of international law.'0 3
The OECD Draft Convention likely adopted its view on the issue directly
from the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, which also purported to
ground the obligation of fair and equitable treatment in fundamental
principles of international law.'°4 In third-party commentaries on the
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, however, the "grave doubts ... expressed
on the validity" of the Draft Convention's rules meant that the provisions
contained therein could only be viewed as binding upon adoption of the
Convention and not by virtue of their independent existence as customary
international law.'0° Indeed, the absence of international consensus regarding
the substantive protections afforded to investors under customary interna-
troubling nor novel. J.C. Thomas argues that this was precisely the OECD's intention. Thomas,
supra note 35, at 46-49. Nevertheless, this is not the interpretation that the Pope & Talbot, Inc.
tribunal adopted and that has subsequently been relied on.
100. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
101. Arthur S. Miller, Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention,
53 Am. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (1959) (quoting GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FORDERUNG DES SCHUTZES VON
AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE MUTUAL PROTECTION OF PRI-
VATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 5 (1957)).
102. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A
Critical Commentary, 9 J. PUB. L. 147, 152 (1960); see also Roy Preiswerk, New Developments in
Bilateral Investment Protection, I REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 173, 186 (1967) (not-
ing that the fair and equitable treatment requirement was "quite different [from] the traditionally
known legal minimum standard of the so-called civilized nations.").
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; cf Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266,
276-77 (Nov. 20) (requiring Colombia to demonstrate state practice and opiniojuris in support of
the "American international law in general" that Colombia claimed bound Peru); N. Sea Cont'l
Shelf (ER.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43-44 (Feb. 20) (finding that the equidistance method of con-
tinental-shelf delimitation was not customary international law because its use was not accompanied
by "a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it").
104. See Michael Brandon, An International Investment Code: Current Plans, 1959 J. Bus. L.
7, 12-13.
105. FATOUROS, supra note 5, at 137-38. Fatouros also observes that the rules enunciated in
the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention are "not well-established as principles of international law."
Id. at 137.
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tional law is no less a problem today than it was in the 1950s.' 06 The authors'
commentaries to the Abs-Shawcross Draft provide citations to cases of the
ICJ and the Permanent Court of International Justice to demonstrate the va-
lidity of nondiscrimination and the exclusion of unreasonable conduct as
general concepts within law.'°7 The authors, however, do not offer any sup-
port for the assertion that fair and equitable treatment has a binding legal
nature as a general principle.
The state of the law of investor treatment at the time of the OECD Draft
Convention argues against a binding obligation of fair and equitable treat-
ment based on general principles of international law.108 In contrast to the
categorical prohibition on genocide in the major multilateral treaty on the
subject, the previous multilateral efforts to develop standards for protection
of international investment explicitly accommodated standards of treatment
that were less than fair and equitable. This is true even if fair and equitable
treatment is contrasted with other standards established in these treaties, let
alone if fair and equitable treatment were to be given its modern-day addi-
tive interpretation. As seen above, the Havana Charter imposed no
obligation to provide just and equitable treatment: if the applicable general
principles of international law required adoption of the standard, the parties
could easily have expressed that fact in the text of the Charter. The Havana
Charter does, however, impose a negative obligation against a state party
taking "unreasonable or unjustifiable action within its territory injurious to
the rights or interests" of the investments of other members' nationals. 9
Developments subsequent to the Havana Charter also indicate that most
countries did not view the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment
as a binding general principle of international law. A 1958 resolution of the
International Bar Association listed the general principles applicable to for-
eign investors. But the resolution did not include any reference to fair and
equitable treatment, stating only that "the principle pacta sunt servanda ap-
plies to the specific engagements of States towards ... the Nationals of
other States" while recognizing a state's inherent right to expropriate."0 One
year later, the Directing Committee of the Association for the Promotion
and Protection of Private Foreign Investment ("APPFI") included the re-
quirement that "[a]liens and their property ... be treated without
discrimination" in a list of general principles governing foreign investment
under international law but did not include a reference to fair and equitable
106. McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 203, 218-19; Dolzer, supra note 2, at 87;
Porterfield, supra note 9, at 80-81.
107. Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors, 9 J. PUB. L. 119, 120 (1960).
108. See Brandon, supra note 104, at 7.
109. Havana Charter, supra note 80, art. 11 (1)(b). One contemporary observer saw the Havana
Charter as requiring states to "afford adequate security for existing and future investments," but
textual support for this view is lacking. Clair Wilcox, The Promise of the World Trade Charter, 27
FOREIGN AFF. 486, 491 (1949).
110.. INT'L BAR ASS'N, SEVENTH CONFERENCE REPORT: COLOGNE, JULY 1958 485 (1958).
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treatment."' A Council of Europe report issued in the same year as the
APPFI principles stated that countries wishing to attract foreign investment
should make a commitment to treat foreign enterprises in an "equitable
manner.""2 The report describes equitable treatment not as an inherent right
of foreign investors but rather as being gained in exchange for an investor's
agreement to stay out of domestic politics and contribute to the development
of the host state."
3
The different mix of states involved in the drafting of the OECD Draft
Conventions on one hand and the Havana Charter, the League of Nations
Covenant, and the Bogotdi Declaration on the other likely explains the dis-
crepancy between the treatment of the standard in the two classes of
documents. While only industrialized countries participated in the drafting
of the OECD Draft Convention, the texts of the other multilateral documents
reflect a compromise between rich countries and developing countries." 4 In
developing its draft charter of the ITO, the United States was conscious of
the need to keep developing countries on board. As a result, the U.S. pro-
posals did not press too hard for more favorable treaty provisions on
investment so as to avoid criticism of the ITO as another manifestation of
the "general pursuit of economic hegemony in the service of American
'capitalistic-imperialism.' """ Developing countries expressed a wide variety
of objections to increased protection for international investment.' 6 Some
viewed the presence of transnational companies as an impediment to re-
gional integration.' '7 Others wished to preserve greater regulatory authority
over their infant industries and viewed the influx of foreign capital as foster-
111. Michael Brandon, Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment Climate, 9 J.
PUB. L. 125, 126 (1960). The Council of Europe also drew a distinction between equitable treatment
and the principle of nondiscrimination in its Report on an Investment Statute. Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Report on an Investment Statute and a Guarantee Fund against political risks, 11 th Sess., Doc. No.
1027, para. 39 (1959).
112. Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, Report on an Investment Statute and a Guar-
antee Fund against political risks, 1 th Sess., Doc. No. 1027, para. 13 (1959).
113. Id. para. 25.
114. HOWARD S. PIQUET & HERMANN FICKER, THE HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION: ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON 2 (1950); see also Int'l Chamber of
Commerce, International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments, at 18-19 (1953) [herein-
after ICC Code]; MILAN BULAJI , PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW:
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 79 (2d rev. ed. 1993); MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 218;
Jacob Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 612, 628 (1947);
Wilcox, supra note 109, at 486.
115. Viner, supra note 114, at 626-27. Indeed, the initial U.S. proposal for the Charter of the
ITO did not include any reference to protection of international investments. Report of the First
Session of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 82, at 52-67.
116. Miller, supra note 101, at 375-78.
117. U.N. Centre on Transnational Corps., Measures Strengthening the Negotiating Capacity
of Governments in their Relations with Transnational Corporations: Regional Integration
Cum/Versus Corporate Integration, 28-34, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/10 (1982) (prepared by Constantine
V. Vaitsos).
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ing the continuation of a colonial economy." 8 Developing countries also
sought to preserve their ability to act in pursuit of legitimate policy objec-
tives that could be compromised by treaty language viewed as too solicitous
of investor rights."9
With the developing countries out of the room and therefore under no
pressure to compromise, the OECD took an opportunity, common in inter-
national law advocacy, 20 to assert that its proposal in fact represented the
present state of customary international law. In so doing, the OECD coun-
tries offered even greater protection to foreign investors than the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") had in its 1949 International
Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments. The ICC Code was explic-
itly designed to correct portions of the Havana Charter that it viewed as
unfavorable 2' and to convince developing countries of the potential benefits• 122
of foreign direct investment. The operative clauses of the ICC Code, how-
ever, include no reference to a binding noncontingent standard of treatment.
Only the preamble contains a hortatory call "to establish ... conditions of




Given the proliferation of BITs, the importance of developing a consen-
sus regarding the proper approach to interpreting fair and equitable
treatment provisions cannot be overstated. In particular, governments must
be able to predict the circumstances under which they will be susceptible to
the broad disciplines of an additive interpretation of the requirement to pro-
vide investors with fair and equitable treatment. The cacophony of
international tribunal holdings with regard to the relationship between fair
and equitable treatment and the customary minimum standard makes it im-
possible for governments to accurately predict the obligations imposed by
customary international law.
118. Econ., Fin., & Transit Dep't, Industrialization and Foreign Trade, 66-67, League of
Nations Doc. 1945.II.A. 10 (1945).
119. See MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 3-4 (1993).
120. See BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 503 (stating that the tendency of scholars and tribunals
"to give the international standard a too ambitious content" has been a "source of difficulty");
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 212 (1989) (pointing out that idealism is often transposed into law through the devel-
opment of new "general principles"); Robert Y. Jennings, Teachings and Teaching in International
Law, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 121, 127 (Jerzy
Makarczyk ed., 1984); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J.
INT'L L. 413, 415-16 (1983) (discussing the propensity for international organizations to blur the
"normativity threshold" in their resolutions). In this regard, the OECD can be seen as furthering a
U.S. plan to project "principles favorable to foreign capital ... onto the international plane." Walker,
supra note 78, at 229.
121. ICC Code, supra note 114, at 18-19.
122. Jd.at9-10.
123. Id. at 13.
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This Note argues that a major source of this uncertainty, the adoption of
a convergence approach by a number of international tribunals, can and
should be eliminated. The convergence approach suffers from the fatal flaw
of "crossing the streams." While purporting to articulate the international
minimum standard of treatment for aliens, these tribunals in fact rely upon a
stream of jurisprudence developed under a plain meaning interpretation of
the fair and equitable treatment treaty provisions. This approach incorrectly
states the content of customary international law and should not guide future
tribunals. Given the limited options for review of arbitral awards, by over-
stating a state's customary obligations to investors, convergence threatens to
unexpectedly expose governments to liability for simple failure to maintain
an adequately stable investment framework. This could occur in the event
that a tribunal were to apply the convergence approach to the minimum
standard in a context where a state has not accepted an independent obliga-
tion to provide fair and equitable treatment. Convergence also muddies the
waters for future tribunals attempting to discern the applicable standard of
treatment.
The Note's analysis of the early multilateral conventions demonstrates
that the convergence approach is inconsistent with the evolution of fair and
equitable treatment as a concept within international economic law. The idea
that customary international law imposed an obligation to treat foreign
commerce fairly and equitably emerged only in the 1950s and only among
rich countries. To date, no legal or empirical study has shown that custom-
ary international law imposes an obligation to treat investors fairly and
equitably. Tribunals should therefore be careful to distinguish between the
jurisprudence articulating an additive approach to fair and equitable treat-
ment and the jurisprudence relating to the customary minimum standard. By
separating questions relating to fair and equitable treatment from questions
relating to the minimum standard of treatment under international law, adju-
dicators, states, and investors would all benefit from greater clarity.
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